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Öcal NecmioğluAbstract
Since 1900, around 90,000 people have lost their lives in 76 earthquakes in Turkey, with a total affected population
of around 7 million and direct losses of around 25 billion USD. Based on a time-dependent model that includes
coseismic and post-seismic effects of the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake with moment magnitude Mw = 7.4, Parsons
(J Geophys Res. 109, 2004) concluded that the probability of an earthquake with Mw > 7 in the Sea of Marmara
near Istanbul is 35 to 70 % in the next 30 years. According to a 2011 study, an earthquake with Mw = 7.25 on the
Main Marmara Fault is expected to heavily damage or destroy 2 to 4 % of around 1,000,000 buildings in Istanbul
with a population around 13 million, with 9 to 15 % of the buildings receiving medium damage and 20 to 34 % of
the buildings damaged lightly (Erdik, Science 341:72, 2013). In the absence of adequate post-earthquake assembly
areas especially in the heavily urbanized Istanbul, it is evident that after a major earthquake, especially in the coastal
parts of the city, citizens would be storming to landfill assembly and recreational areas. Besides earthquakes, around
30 tsunamis have been reported by Altınok et al. (Natural Hazards Earth System Science 11:273–293, 2011) in the
Marmara Sea. Among those, catastrophic earthquakes such as 1509, 1766, and 1894 resulted in considerable
tsunamis and some damage. The latest tsunami observed in Marmara was due to a triggered submarine
landslide of the 1999 Mw = 7.4 Kocaeli earthquake which led to reported run-up heights of 1–3 m in most
places (Tinti et al., Marine Geology 225:311–330, 2006). In this study, I propose a design for a tsunami warning system
specific for the Marmara region that is strongly coupled with the earthquake early warning system (due to the short
arrival times of tsunami) and stakeholders of the tsunami mitigation activities, such as local and regional components
of disaster and emergency management and civil protection units, to ensure that the citizens would remain away from
the coastline in case of a large earthquake, while discussing associated challenges such as decoupled earthquake and
tsunami mitigation activities in the Marmara region.
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Since 1900, around 90,000 people have lost their lives
in 76 earthquakes in Turkey, with a total affected
population of around 7 million and direct losses of
around 25 billion USD. Based on a time-dependent
model that includes coseismic and post-seismic effects
of the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake with moment magni-
tude (Mw) = 7.4, Parsons (2004) concluded that the
probability of an earthquake with Mw > 7 in the Sea
of Marmara near Istanbul is 35 to 70 % in the next
30 years (Erdik 2013). A recent study also confirmed
that the probability of occurrence of an earthquake ofCorrespondence: ocal.necmioglu@boun.edu.tr
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifmagnitude greater than 7 is high in the Marmara re-
gion. While most of the large events are characterized
by epicenters located in the central or eastern parts
of the Sea of Marmara, the possibility of a western-
initiated rupture propagating eastwards cannot be
ruled out (Aochi and Ulrich 2015). Bohnhoff et al.
(2013) indicated that the remarkable sequence of
large earthquakes over the last century in the North
Anatolian Fault Zone (NAFZ) has left an earthquake
gap south of Istanbul and beneath the Marmara Sea,
which has not been filled for 250 years. They argue,
furthermore, that the Prince Islands segment is locked
and is therefore a potential nucleation point for an-
other Marmara segment earthquake. This hypothesis
has been further supported by Ergintav et al. (2014),distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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lation on the Prince Islands segment, constraining the slip
deficit rate to 10–15 mm/year, concluding that the Prince
Islands segment is most likely to generate the next M > 7
earthquake along the Sea of Marmara segment of the
NAFZ. According to a 2011 study, an earthquake with
Mw= 7.25 on the Main Marmara Fault is expected to
heavily damage or destroy 2 to 4 % of around 1,000,000
buildings in Istanbul with a population around 13 million,
with 9 to 15 % of the buildings receiving medium
damage and 20 to 34 % of the buildings damaged
lightly (Erdik 2013).
Historical tsunamis in the Marmara Sea
The historical tsunamis in the Marmara Sea has been
described in detail in various references (Mihailovic
1927; Gundogdu 1986; Oztin and Bayülke 1991; Oztin
1994; Ambraseys and Finkel 1987, 1995; Altınok and
Ersoy 2000; Arel and Kiper 2000; Altınok et al. 2001,
2003, 2011; Yalciner et al. 2001a, b, c; Ambraseys 2002;
Cetin et al. 2004; Rothaus et al. 2004; Tinti et al. 2006;
Meral Ozel et al. 2011). Among those, the mostFig. 1 Main faults, seismic and Istanbul earthquake early warning network,
Marmara region. Places referred in the text have been shown with number
(5) Gemlik Bay, (6) Bosphorus, (7) Dardanelles, (8) Tekirdağ, (9) Izmit Bay, (10
(15) Maltepeimportant ones are the Istanbul earthquakes on 10
September 1509, on 22 May 1766, and on 10 July 1894;
the Sarkoy-Murefte earthquake on 9 August 1912; and
the 17 August 1999 Kocaeli earthquake. Please refer to
Fig. 1 for the locations referred throughout the text.
The Istanbul earthquake on 10 September 1509 was
one of the largest and most destructive earthquakes of
the last five centuries in the Eastern Mediterranean. It
occurred in the Marmara Sea and caused damage over
the entire Marmara region, with maximum damage in
Istanbul. The earthquake killed 4000–5000 people in the
city and destroyed over 1000 houses. Along the coast,
the sea flooded the shores and waves crashed against the
walls of the old city (Ambraseys and Finkel 1995). In
some locations, waves overtopped the walls and caused
flooding. The wave height was most probably more than
6.0 m, and the magnitude of the earthquake was close to
8.0 (Oztin and Bayülke 1991).
During the 22 May 1766 Istanbul earthquake, which
was destructive mostly around Eastern Marmara and its
associated tsunami also caused considerable damage in
Gemlik Bay in Eastern Marmara (Ambraseys and Finkeland Sea Bottom Observation system currently operational in the
ed circles: (1) Istanbul, (2) Izmit, (3) Prince Islands, (4) Şarköy-Mürefte,
) Değirmendere, (11) Gölcük, (12) Tuzla, (13) Ambarlı, (14) Yenikapı, and
Necmioğlu Earth, Planets and Space  (2016) 68:13 Page 3 of 91995; Altınok et al. 2003), the waves were also recog-
nized in Istanbul and the inner parts of the Bosphorus
(Cesmi-zade 1766).
Another earthquake in Istanbul occurred on 10 July
1894, damaged Istanbul and the surrounding area,
and was felt in the Eastern Balkans, Crete, and Central
Anatolia. The earthquake killed 474 people and injured
482 more and destroyed 1773 houses (Oztin 1994).
According to Mihailovic (1927), the sea rose up and inun-
dated 200 m and, after a few disturbances, became normal.
The Sarkoy-Murefte earthquake on 9 August 1912
is the latest event to the west before the 1999 Kocaeli
earthquake. It occurred on the active Ganos Fault
zone in Western Marmara and was one of the largest
earthquakes in the Balkans. The historical data, geo-
logical field surveys, and offshore geophysical investiga-
tions have shown that the 1912 earthquake produced a
tsunami. In addition, a seabed dislocation, the source of
1912 tsunami, can also be assigned to the sediment
slumps appearing in the form of echelon landslide prisms
along the southern slopes of the West Marmara Trough
(Altınok et al. 2003). The most significant findings about
tsunami event were classified depending on their observa-
tion place (Altınok et al. 2003). Most of the coastal area of
the Dardanelles were inundated by sea waves (Mihailovic
1927; Gundogdu 1986). In Tekirdag in Western Marmara,
the sea receded after the earthquake along the coast and
then returned with some force causing no damage
(Ambraseys and Finkel 1987).
It has been shown that the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake
with Mw = 7.4 has also created a tsunami in Izmit
Bay (Altınok et al. 2001; Tinti et al. 2006). Post-event
field surveys and interview of eyewitnesses conducted
soon after the tsunami occurrence by several teams
enabled to determine the coastal areas of major wave
impact and to quantify the run-up heights and the
sea penetration lengths in all the affected places. The
tsunami observation times were close to the main
shock. Almost in all places, the tsunami was seen to
cause the sea to withdraw first and then to overcome
the usual shoreline and inundate land. The observed
tsunami run-up heights were modest and typically in
the range of 1–3 m. The tsunami was damaging, but
not catastrophic. In some places, it was strong
enough to carry boats and vessels on land (Altınok
et al. 2001; Rothaus et al. 2004). A detailed descrip-
tion of the tsunami observations can be found in the
works by Yalciner et al. (2000, 2001a, b, c) and by
Altınok et al. (2001) and has been integrated in a
study by Rothaus et al. (2004) that focuses on the ef-
fects in the southern coast of Izmit Bay (Tinti et al.
2006). The tsunami was exceptionally violent only in
the town of Degirmendere. Here, measured wave run-
ups exceeded 4 m, but several eyewitnesses state thatthe wave reached the second floor of the buildings in
the waterfront (observation was made by the joint
Italian-Turkish team that included Stefano Tinti,
Alberto Armigliato, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner, and Yildiz
Altınok; Tinti et al. 2006), and some other estimate a
height of about 15 m (Rothaus et al. 2004). Ships
moored in the port of Degirmendere were severely
affected by the waves, and seamen reported that the
attacking wave was probably larger than 10 m (Altınok
et al. 2001). Perhaps, the same large wave struck
ships moored in the next town of Kavakli, east of
Golcuk: here, the tsunami came over a ship reaching
a height of more than 15 m, according to witnesses’
rough evaluation (Rothaus et al. 2004). The anomal-
ous violence of the tsunami in the limited area
around Degirmendere is the consequence of an add-
itional local tsunamigenic source that was identified
in a slump (Arel and Kiper 2000; Altınok et al. 2001;
Cetin et al. 2004; Tinti et al. 2006).Tsunami characteristics in the Marmara Sea from
the point of early warning
In a previous study conducted by OYO Pacific Consul-
tants International Corporation et al. (2002), more than
50 cases of tsunami sources due to the movement of
the NAFZ in the Marmara Sea, landslide along the
cliffs, and their combinations had been considered. The
study showed that the estimated tsunami heights due to
the NAFZ segments with small vertical displacement
could not explain the historical tsunami heights. On
the other hand, the estimated tsunami heights due to
submarine landslides alone are not big but sharp at
local areas. The tsunami heights due to the combin-
ation of the movement of the NAFZ and a triggered
submarine landslide can mostly explain the historical
tsunami records (Kaneko 2009). A possible future
earthquake occurring in the Marmara Sea has a direct
tsunamigenic potential and, furthermore, may set in
motion submarine masses (landslides or slumps), with
additional possibility to produce tsunamis (Yalciner
et al. 2001a, b, c; Hebert et al. 2005; Tinti et al. 2006).
The fact that a submarine landslide triggered by an
earthquake could be the primary cause of a tsunami in
the Marmara Sea, as indicated by the historical cata-
logues and previous studies, shows the importance of
an earthquake early warning-coupled tsunami warning
system without waiting for any focal mechanism par-
ameter determination that may lead to an underestima-
tion of the tsunami risk in the case of a strike-slip fault,
which is the dominant seismotectonic characteristic of
the Marmara Sea. This argument could be further sup-
ported by the fact that tsunami arrival times in the
Marmara Sea range between 5 and 60 min (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 Arrival times of initial tsunami (top) and maximum tsunami waves (bottom) based on the initial results from the earthquake-generated
tsunami scenario database for the Marmara Sea. Color codes indicate arrival times: red <5 min, yellow 5–15 min, green >15 min. Historical
records, as in the case of the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake and tsunami, indicate that in the case of a submarine landslide tsunami, the arrival time
of the maximum tsunami wave could be less than 5 min
Necmioğlu Earth, Planets and Space  (2016) 68:13 Page 4 of 9Elements at risk for a credible tsunami event for
Istanbul
Hancilar (2012) identified the elements at risk for a
credible tsunami event for Istanbul by utilizing inunda-
tion maps resulting from probabilistic tsunami hazard
analysis for a 10 % probability of exceedance in 50 years
in combination with the geo-coded inventories of
building stock, lifeline systems, and demographic data.
While noting that the built environment on Istanbul’s
shorelines exposed to tsunami inundation comprises
residential, commercial, industrial, public buildings
(governmental/municipal, schools, hospitals, sports,
and religious), infrastructure (car parks, garages, fuel
stations, electricity transformer buildings), and military
buildings, as well as piers and ports, gas tanks and sta-
tions, and other urban elements (e.g., recreational facil-
ities), he further argued that along the Marmara Sea
shore, Tuzla (Fig. 1) shipyards and important port and
petrochemical facilities at Ambarlı (Fig. 1) are expected
to be exposed to tsunami hazard. Hancilar (2012) also
stated that significant lifeline systems of the city of
Istanbul such as natural gas, electricity, telecommuni-
cation, and sanitary and waste-water transmission are
also under the threat of tsunamis and in terms of socialrisk, and he estimated that there are about 32,000 in-
habitants exposed to tsunami hazard. It should be
emphasized, however, that Hancilar (2012) considered
only seismic sources and as himself pointed out, that
while it could be said that the eastern coasts of
Istanbul are more hazardous than the western coast-
lines, numerical modeling and hazard assessment con-
sidering submarine landslides might result in different
inundations on the shorelines of the city. In other
words, his conclusions could be considered as corre-
sponding to the best-case tsunami scenario and the
risk would be considerably higher in the case of a
tsunami due to coseismic submarine landslide.
Earthquake and tsunami preparedness
Disaster Preparedness Education Unit (DPEU) of
Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute
(KOERI) has been contributing to the preparation of the
community to a destructive earthquake through increased
disaster awareness, local preparedness, first-response
organization, and skills across the country. DPEU is
already involved in developing, supervising, and evaluating
training programs on disaster risk management; prepar-
ation and dissemination of training materials such as
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ation of a pool of trainers within KOERI; providing
training programs at the national level in cooperation
with other agencies if necessary; and organizing na-
tional and international seminars, workshop, and public
activities. DPEU earthquake training packages are Basic
Disaster Awareness, Community Disaster Volunteers,
Nonstructural Risk Mitigation, and Structural Awareness
for Seismic Safety. DPEU’s experience and know-how on
earthquake awareness, preparedness, and mitigation is be-
ing used to reach the same level of maturity concerning
the tsunami hazard education and awareness-raising
activities. In this spirit, KOERI has participated in the
North-Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Tsunami
Information Centre (NEAMTIC) Project on a self-
funded base for the translation of selected material in
Turkish, such as educational poster, website/virtual
library interface, and coastal inundation online course,
of good and guidelines/poster on hotel evacuation
practices compendium. In addition, within the EC-FP7
Project ASTARTE and “MarDiM: Earthquake and
Tsunami Disaster Mitigation in the Marmara Region
and Disaster Education in Turkey” project supported
by JICA/SATREPS, KOERI executed an assessment of
tsunami studies conducted in Turkey that includes pub-
lished articles, oral and poster presentations, books, and
several awareness materials produced. Furthermore, studies
around the globe have also been evaluated, and particular
emphasis was given to preparedness studies in Japan. In
direct consultation with a group of Japanese experts, expe-
riences and preparedness material produced in Japan, such
as booklets, videos, and animations, have also been studied.
As a result of this, a “tsunami information booklet” has
been prepared as an educational material. An educational
short video has also been prepared in consultation with
Japanese experts. To assess the effectiveness of the pro-
duced material, a pre- and post-questionnaire with 10 ques-
tions have been prepared, which comprised three sections
as personal attributes, general questions, and understand-
ing tsunami. This questionnaire has been applied to pupils
visiting KOERI’s Disaster Preparedness Education Unit.
A lot has been accomplished in Turkey after the 1999
Kocaeli earthquake in terms of earthquake prepared-
ness. This is especially valid for the Istanbul Metropolitan
Area, where comprehensive re-urbanization is taking
place to ensure non-earthquake-proof buildings are re-
placed with earthquake-proof buildings. The criticality of
this re-urbanization is evident according to a 2011 study,
which shows that an earthquake with Mw= 7.25 on the
Main Marmara Fault is expected to heavily damage or
destroy 2 to 4 % of around 1,000,000 buildings in Istanbul
with a population around 13 million, with 9 to 15 % of the
buildings receiving medium damage and 20 to 34 % of the
buildings damaged lightly (Erdik 2013).While the full analysis of the relation of the urban
planning and earthquake hazard is beyond the scope
of this study, it is important to re-emphasize that
post-disaster provision of shelter, food, medical, and
social services to people is among the key elements
of disaster management and recovery plans. For al-
most more than a decade now, Istanbul Metropolitan
City has been undergoing a heavy re-urbanization,
where most of the open spaces that have been identi-
fied after the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake as post-disaster
evacuation and assembly areas have been opened for
large-scale constructions for shopping malls and
luxury residences. While the exact number and infor-
mation on how many areas originally designated as
assembly zones have been transformed into other types of
locations is lacking, reports of non-governmental orga-
nizations claim that more than half of these areas are
on stake. In an obvious effort to compensate this loss,
the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality created mass-
landfill areas without bore-pile installation, both in the
European and Asian coasts of the city, in Yenikapı and
Maltepe districts, with 0.5 and 1.5 km2 areas, respect-
ively (Fig. 3). These areas have been introduced as open
public spaces and recreational areas, also to be used as
assembly areas after an earthquake. In addition, the
question of how these landfill areas will respond to the
earthquake load remains still open. Already in 2002, the
total area of the open spaces for evacuation and post-
disaster assembly purposes had been identified as less
than 25 % of demand especially in the Maltepe area sit-
uated already in a region where the thickness of the
layer subject to a possible liquefaction is determined as
between 4 and 50 m. The maximum expected tsunami
wave height was simulated as 5.5 m, and inundation
distance is less than 150 m (excluding newly established
landfill areas). The expected lifetime of a tsunami in
Istanbul is between 90 and 120 min (OYO Pacific
Consultants International Corporation et al. 2002).
Concerning the fact that post-disaster evacuation and
assembly area maps are publicly available neither from
the Civil Protection Authority nor from the Istanbul
Metropolitan Municipality, it is evident that after a
major earthquake, especially in the coastal parts of the
city, citizens would be storming to these landfill areas
in the absence of post-disaster assembly areas inland.
In case of a tsunami triggered by an earthquake or sub-
marine landslide due to an earthquake, the logistical
plans relying to these landfill areas for disaster manage-
ment would be expected to collapse.
KOERI’s tsunami warning system with regional
services
KOERI’s Regional Earthquake and Tsunami Monitoring
Center (RETMC) is 24/7 operational National Tsunami
Fig. 3 Maltepe and Yenikapı landfill areas of Istanbul Metropolitan City. These areas have been introduced as open public spaces and recreational
areas, also to be used as assembly areas after an earthquake
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Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas since 1
July 2012 as a Candidate Tsunami Service Provider
(CTSP-TR) under the framework of the Intergovernmen-
tal Coordination Group for the Tsunami Early Warning
and Mitigation System in the North-eastern Atlantic, the
Mediterranean and connected seas (ICG/NEAMTWS)
initiative. Duty officers of the RETMC perform internal
tests of the tsunami warning system on a daily basis based
on pre-determined set of scenarios. In addition, KOERI
performs regular communication test exercise with other
CTSPs and participates in NEAMTWS Communication
and Tsunami Exercises. The system relies on decision
criteria based on the Mw and the hypocenter of the
earthquake and could be supported with the use of a
pre-calculated tsunami scenario database, where espe-
cially the accurate calculation of the Mw poses a critical
element of the accurate early warning. This approach is
applicable to basin-scale-generated tsunamis and currently
adopted by the NEAMTWS.
Temporal boundary conditions for a near-field
tsunami early warning system
The temporal boundary conditions of a tsunami early
warning system is clearly described in Papadopoulos and
Fokaefs (2013). According to them, the operative effi-
ciency of a tsunami warning system in near-field condi-
tions depends on the times needed for seismic signal
communication, tS, and for evacuation, tE, where each iscomposed by more than one time components. Seismic
signal communication incorporates the time needed for
the determination of the earthquake focal parameters,
tSD, and the time needed for the tsunami decision-
making, tTD, as well as the time, tST, needed for the
transmission of the earthquake information and of the
result of the tsunami decision to the operational center
of the civil protection. In addition, the time for evacu-
ation incorporates another two time components. The
first is the time, tWT, needed to transmit warning infor-
mation from the civil protection to the population.
Finally, after transmitting this information, there is a
need to allow for some time to respond for real evacu-
ation, tEV. According to these descriptions, they con-
clude that from the operational point of view, the
following condition has to be satisfied for an effective
tsunami early warning in near field:
TTR > tSD þ tTD þ tST þ tWT þ tEV;
where TTR is the tsunami travel time.
Considering the extreme short arrival times, the clas-
sical approach in tsunami early warning systems de-
scribed above based on KOERI’s regional services cannot
be utilized in a near-field system such as the Marmara
Sea and a more direct approach is needed. In the case of
Marmara, the only way to ensure the effectiveness of a
tsunami early warning is couple the tsunami early warn-
ing system with the earthquake early warning system.
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The details of the Istanbul earthquake early warning
(IEEW) system are given in Erdik et al. (2003), Mert
et al. (2004), and in Alcik et al. (2009). The IEEW system
is composed of 10 strong-motion stations located as
close as possible to the Great Marmara Fault zone in
“online” mode (Fig. 4). The continuous online data from
these stations is used to provide real-time warning for
emerging potentially disastrous earthquakes. Consider-
ing the complexity of fault rupture and the short fault
distances involved, a simple and robust early warning
algorithm, based on the exceedance of specified thresh-
old time domain amplitude levels (band-pass-filtered
accelerations and the cumulative absolute velocity), is
implemented. The early warning information (consisting
three alarm levels) are communicated to the appropriate
servo shutdown systems of the recipient facilities, which
will automatically decide proper action based on the
alarm level. When a band-pass-filtered peak ground ac-
celeration (PGA) and cumulative absolute velocity (CAV,
the time integral of the absolute acceleration over the
duration of the earthquake record) on any channel, in a
given station, exceeds specific threshold values (currently
set at 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2 m/s2), it is considered a vote.
Whenever there are votes from at least three stations for
the respective threshold value within a 10-s (selectable)
time interval, the respective alarm level is declared. 0.2,
0.4 and 0.7 m/s alert levels based on bracketed CAV
window approach (BCAV-W) have been proposed byFig. 4 Schematic representation of the proposed tsunami early warning syAlcik et al. (2009). Depending on the location of the
earthquake (initiation of fault rupture) and the recipient
facility, the alarm time can be as high as about 8 s. The
system is connected to the Istanbul Natural Gas Distri-
bution Network, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,
and Marmaray (submarine tube operated by the Turkish
State Highways) for emergency traffic stopping.
In addition, KOERI started a new era in its observa-
tional capabilities by installing five sea-floor observation
systems in the Sea of Marmara within the Sea Bottom
Observatory (SBO) Project supported by Turkish
Telecom, including broadband seismometers and dif-
ferential pressuremeters, pressure transducer, strong-
motion sensor, hydrophone, temperature measurement
device, and flow meter (Fig. 1). The first sea bottom
observation element was installed in December 2009
with real-time data transmission to KOERI. The seismic
component of the sea floor observation system improves
the azimuthal and spatial distribution of the existing
network and reduces the early warning time and the mini-
mum magnitude threshold down to 1.0 in the Marmara
Sea, especially close to the northern branch of the NAFZ,
which is the most active fault zone in the Marmara Sea
(Meral Ozel et al. 2011).
Proposed TEWS in Marmara
In the case of Marmara, the only way to ensure the
effectiveness of a tsunami early warning is couple the
tsunami early warning system with the earthquakestem in the Marmara Sea
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ation of tSD, the time needed for the determination of
the earthquake focal parameters, and tTD, the time
needed for the tsunami decision-making, through
automation. These conditions are the main difference
with a tsunami early warning system at the regional
level. The proposed system for the Marmara Sea, as a
modification to Papadopoulos and Fokaefs (2013), is
strongly coupled with the IEEW system, also to address
the possibility of an earthquake-triggered submarine-
landslide-generated tsunami. In the proposed system, a
tsunami warning would be disseminated automatically
1 min after the highest threshold of the IEEW with three
votes has been received. This artificial 1-min delay would
ensure to eliminate the possibility of a tsunami warning in
case of a false alarm produced by the IEEW. The alert
would be disseminated to the relevant authorities, such as
the regional and the national Civil Protection Authority,
Port Authorities and Critical Infrastructures, Coastal
Safety, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Navy and
Coast Guard, and also to the public through various types
of communication technologies such as sirens, cell and
VHF broadcasting, e-mail, fax, and mobile phone applica-
tions (Fig. 4). The disseminated alert message functions as
a reminder on the possibility of a tsunami generated by
the earthquake that has been felt by the public already at
the time the tsunami warning message has been issued.
This way, the elimination of the time needed for the deter-
mination of the earthquake focal parameters, tSD, and the
time needed for the tsunami decision-making, tTD,
through automation and direct coupling with the IEEW,
would reduce the total time needed to generate the alert
to close to 1 min. This setting would also eliminate tST,
the time needed for the transmission of the earthquake
information and of the result of the tsunami decision to
the operational center of the civil protection and other
relevant authorities, through integrated system-to-system
communications. Since the message would be issued
through open communication channels to the public, it
could be argued that tWT, the time needed to transmit
warning information from the civil protection to the
population, is eliminated, also. The total time for the dis-
semination of the alert would be less than 1 min. tEV, the
time needed by the authorities or the citizens to respond
for real evacuation, depends solely on the level of
awareness and preparedness of the end user, whether
an authority or citizen. Nevertheless, it would be realis-
tic to expect that citizens with high degree awareness
of tsunami hazard in the Marmara Sea would respond
in less than 1 min. All of the reductions described
above would lead to a maximum of 3 min total respond
time by the end user. In the case of the citizen as the
end user, the respond would need to be translated into
action by not approaching the coastline for at least 2 h,which has been defined as the maximum expected life-
time of a tsunami in Istanbul (OYO Pacific Consultants
International Corporation et al. 2002).
It could be argued that, while the proposed system is
adequate to issue a tsunami warning based on the
strong ground motion through coupling to the IEEW
system, a warning may not be issued for a tsunami due
to a submarine landslide triggered by a weak ground
motion. This could be considered as a drawback of the
proposed system, but considering the history of
earthquake-coupled tsunami observations in the Marmara
region, it could be also argued that there is a low possibil-
ity for such event. In fact, the time interval of 5–15 min
required to observe and process the tsunami signal on the
differential pressuremeters in the deployed SBO would
void the tsunami early warning.
Conclusions
The fact that a submarine landslide triggered by an
earthquake could be the primary cause of a tsunami in
the Marmara Sea, as indicated by the historical cata-
logues and previous studies, shows the importance of an
earthquake early warning-coupled tsunami warning sys-
tem without waiting for any focal mechanism parameter
determination that may lead to an underestimation of
the tsunami risk in the case of a strike-slip fault earth-
quake, which sets the dominant seismotectonic charac-
teristic of the Marmara Sea. Through a tsunami warning
system directly coupled with the Istanbul earthquake
early warning system and based on system-to-system
communications, an effective tsunami warning could be
made within 3 min to ensure that citizens of the coastal
areas would stay away from the direct coastline for at
least 2 h after the earthquake has occurred. A pre-
calculated comprehensive tsunami scenario database
may assist the decision-making process with its use in
evaluating sea-level data available to the tsunami warn-
ing system in real time.
The implementation of the proposed tsunami warn-
ing system would require commitment and collabor-
ation of KOERI, national Civil Protection Authority
(AFAD), and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as the
primary stakeholders. In addition, the involvement of
Port Authorities, Coastal Safety, Navy and Coast Guard,
and municipalities of other coastal cities of the
Marmara region should further strengthen this collab-
oration. Nevertheless, regardless of any model, the ef-
fectiveness of any tsunami early warning depends
purely on the awareness and preparedness of the civil
protection authorities and the public. Despite all recent
efforts, in the absence of such awareness in the Marmara
region, a possible earthquake-generated tsunami may
increase the number of casualties simply due to the
fact that, in the absence of post-disaster assembly
Necmioğlu Earth, Planets and Space  (2016) 68:13 Page 9 of 9areas inland, the residents of the coastal areas may
storm to the shoreline, especially to Maltepe and
Yenikapı landfill assembly areas, in an attempt to save
lives from the structural damage due to the earthquake.
Therefore, especially in Istanbul, there is a strong and
urgent need to couple earthquake and tsunami disaster
mitigation and management strategies and special focus
should be given to the public education and preparedness
based on this coupled strategy.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Authors’ information
Dr. Öcal Necmioğlu is the coordinator of the KOERI-Tsunami Working Group
for the establishment of a 24/7 operational National Tsunami Warning Center
(NTWC-TR), also providing services to the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean,
and Black Seas as a Candidate Tsunami Service Provider (CTSP-TR) under the
framework of the Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Tsunami
Early Warning and Mitigation System in the North-eastern Atlantic, the
Mediterranean and connected seas (ICG/NEAMTWS) initiative, and a
member of the ICG/NEAMTWS Steering Committee.
Acknowledgements
This study has benefited from the JICA/SATREPS Project “MarDiM: Earthquake
and Tsunami Disaster Mitigation in the Marmara Region and Disaster Education
in Turkey” supported by JICA/SATREPS and the Ministry of Development in
Turkey, the EC-FP7 Projects “ASTARTE - Assessment, Strategy And Risk Reduction
for Tsunamis in Europe” (Grant Agreement no: 603839) and “MARSite:
New Directions in Seismic Hazard assessment through Focused Earth
Observation in the Marmara Supersite” (Grant agreement no: 308417). I
would like to thank Dr. Mehmet Yılmazer for his support in Fig. 1.
Received: 31 July 2015 Accepted: 16 January 2016
Published: 28 January 2016
References
Alcik H, Ozel O, Apaydin N, Erdik M (2009) A study on warning algorithms for
Istanbul earthquake early warning system. Geophys Res Lett 36:L00B05. doi:
10.1029/2008GL036659
Altınok Y, Ersoy S (2000) Tsunamis observed on and near the Turkish coasts. Nat
Hazards 21:185–205
Altınok Y, Tinti S, Alpar B, Yalçıner AC, Ersoy S, Bortolucci E, Armigliato A (2001)
The tsunami of August 17, 1999 in Izmit Bay, Turkey. Nat Hazards 24:133–146
Altınok Y, Alpar B, Yaltirak C (2003) Sarkoy-Murefte 1912 Earthquake’s Tsunami,
extension of the associated faulting in the Marmara Sea, Turkey. J Seismol 7:
329–346
Altınok Y, Alpar B, Özer N, Aykurt H (2011) Revision of the tsunami catalogue
affecting Turkish coasts and surrounding regions. Natural Hazards Earth
System Science 11:273–293
Ambraseys NN (2002) Seismic sea-waves in the Marmara Sea region during the
last 20 centuries. J Seismol 6:571–578
Ambraseys NN, Finkel C (1995) The seismicity of Turkey and adjacent areas. A
historical review, 1500–1800, Eren Yayıncılık
Ambraseys NN, Finkel CF (1987) The Saros-Marmara earthquake of 9 August 1912.
Earthq Eng Dyn Struct 15:189–211
Aochi H, Ulrich T (2015) A probable earthquake scenario near Istanbul determined
from dynamic simulations. Bull Seismol Soc Am 105(3):1468–1475
Arel E, Kiper B (2000) The coastal landslide occurred by August 17, 1999
earthquake at Degirmendere (Kocaeli). Proceedings of Coastal
Engineering 3rd National Symposium, October 5–7, 2000. Canakkale,
Turkey., pp 45–55 (in Turkish)
Bohnhoff M, Bulu F, Dresen G, Malin PE, Eken T, Aktar M (2013) An earthquake
gap south of Istanbul. Nat Commun 4:1999. doi:10.1038/ncomms2999
Cesmi-zade, M.R., 1766–1768, Cesmizade Tarihi (1766) In: B.S. Kütükoglu (ed.),
Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti Yayınları
Cetin KO, Isik N, Unutmaz B (2004) Seismically induced landslide at
Degirmendere Nose, Izmit Bay during Kocaeli (Izmit)-Turkey earthquake. Soil
Dyn Earthqu Eng 24:189–197Erdik M (2013) Earthquake risk in Turkey. Science 341:72
Erdik M, Fahjan Y, Ozel O, Alcik H, Mert A, Gul M (2003) Istanbul Earthquake Rapid
Response and the Early Warning System Department of Earthquake
Engineering. Bull Earthq Eng 1:157–163
Ergintav S, Reilinger RE, Çakmak R, Floyd M, Çakır Z, Dogan U, King RW, McClusky
S, Özener H (2014) Istanbul’s earthquake hot spots: geodetic constraints on
strain accumulation along faults in the Marmara seismic gap. Geophys Res
Lett 41. doi:10.1002/2014GL060985
Gundogdu O (1986) Türkiye Depremlerinin Kaynak Parametreleri ve Aralarindaki
Iliskiler(Source parameters of earthquakes in Turkey and their relationships),
PhD-Thesis Istanbul University., p 120
Hancilar U (2012) Identification of elements at risk for a credible tsunami event
for Istanbul. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci 12:107–119
Hebert H, Schindele F, Altınok Y, Alpar B, Gazioglu C (2005) Tsunami hazard in
the Marmara Sea (Turkey): a numerical approach to discuss active faulting
and impact on the Istanbul coastal areas. Mar Geol 215:23–43
Kaneko F (2009) A simulation analysis of possible tsunami affecting the Istanbul
coast, Turkey, International Workshop on Tsunami Hazard Assessment and
Management in Bangladesh
Meral Ozel N, Necmioglu O, Yalciner AC, Kalafat D, Mustafa E (2011) Tsunami
hazard in the Eastern Mediterranean and its connected seas: toward a
tsunami warning center in Turkey. Soil Dyn Earthq Eng 31(4):598–610
Mert A, Alçık H, Erdı̇K M, Gül M, Özel O, Fahjan Y (2004) Istanbul Earthquake
Rapid Response And The Early Warning System, 13th World Conference on
Earthquake Engineering Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Mihailovic J (1927) Memoir-Sur les Grands Tremblement de Terre de la Mer de
Marmara, Beograd., pp 215–222
OYO Pacific Consultants International Corporation, Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) (2002)
The study on a disaster prevention/mitigation basic plan in Istanbul
including seismic microzonation in the Republic of Turkey - Final Report
Oztin F (1994) 10 Temmuz 1894 Istanbul Depremi Raporu, T.C. Bayindirlik ve Iskan
Bakanligi, Afet Isleri Genel Mudurlugu, Deprem Arastırma Dairesi, (Report on
10 July 1894 Istanbul Earthquake by Ministry of Public Works and Settlement,
General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, Department of Earthquake Research),
Ankara
Oztin F, Bayülke N (1991) Historical earthquakes of Istanbul, Kayseri, Elazıg. In:
Proceedings of the workshop on historical seismicity and seismotectonics of
the Mediterranean region, 10–12 October 1990 (Istanbul), Turkish Atomic
Energy Authority, Ankara., pp 150–173
Papadopoulos GA, Fokaefs A (2013) Near-field tsunami early warning and
emergency planning in the Mediterranean Sea. Res Geophys 3:24–31
Parsons T (2004) Recalculated probability of M>7 earthquakes beneath the Sea of
Marmara, Turkey. J Geophys Res. 109. doi:10.1029/2003JB002667
Rothaus R, Reinhardt E, Noller J (2004) Regional considerations of coastline
change, tsunami damage and recovery along the southern coast of the Bay
of I˙zmit (The Kocaeli (Turkey) earthquake of 17 August 1999). Nat Hazards
31:233–252
Tinti S, Armigliato A, Manucci A, Pagnoni G, Zaniboni F, Yalciner AC, Altınok Y
(2006) The generating mechanisms of the August 17, 1999 Izmit bay (Turkey)
tsunami: regional (tectonic) and local (mass instabilities) causes. Mar Geol
225:311–330
Yalciner AC, Altınok Y, Synolakis CE (2000) Tsunami waves in Izmit Bay after the
Kocaeli Earthquake. Earthquake Spectra, Kocaeli, Turkey Earthquake of August
17, 1999 Reconnaissance Report, Special Issue Supplement to Professional
Journal of Earthquake Engineering Research Institute vol. 16, pp. 55– 62
Yalciner AC, Imamura F, Kuran U, Cakiroglu Y, Ozbay I, Erdinc E, Durmusoglu O,
Altınok Y, Alpar B (2001a) An integrated model on the generation and
propagation of tsunamis in the surrounding seas around Anatolia-Turkiye
cevresi denizlerde tsunami dalgasi hareketi icin bilesik model olusturulmasi.
Final Report of Basic Research Project No: TUBITAK-YDABCAG-60
Yalciner AC, Kuran U, Altınok Y, Alpar B, Ersoy S (2001b) Historical earthquakes
and associated tsunamis in the Aegean Sea-Turkiye kiyilarinda tarihsel
depremler ve onlara iliskin tsunamlerin izlerinin arastirilmasi. Final Report of
Basic Research Project No: TUBITAK-INTAG-827
Yalciner AC, Synolakis CE, Alpar B, Borrero J, Altınok Y, Imamura F, Tinti S, Ersoy S,
Kuran U, Pamukcu S, Kanoglu U (2001c) Field surveys and modeling of the
1999 Izmit tsunami. Proceedings of the International Tsunami Symposium,
August 7–10, 2001, Seattle, Washington, USA
